A new line of work [6, 9, 15, 2] demonstrates how differential privacy [8] can be used as a mathematical tool for guaranteeing generalization in adaptive data analysis. Specifically, if a differentially private analysis is applied on a sample S of i.i.d. examples to select a lowsensitivity function f , then w.h.p. f (S) is close to its expectation, although f is being chosen based on the data.
Introduction
A new line of work [6, 9, 15, 2] demonstrates how differential privacy [8] can be used as a mathematical tool for guaranteeing statistical validity in data analysis. Specifically, if a differentially private analysis is applied on a sample S of i.i.d. examples to select a low-sensitivity function f , then w.h.p. f (S) is close to its expectation, even when f is being chosen based on the data. Dwork et al. [6] showed how to utilize this connection for the task of answering adaptively chosen queries w.r.t. an unknown distribution using i.i.d. samples from it.
To make the setting concrete, consider a data analyst interested in learning properties of an unknown distribution D. The analyst interacts with the distribution D via a data curator A holding a database S containing n i.i.d. samples from D. The interaction is adaptive, where at every round the analyst specifies a query q : X n → R and receives an answer a q (S) that (hopefully) approximates q(D n ) E S ∼D n [q(S )]. As the analyst chooses its queries based on previous interactions with the data, we run the risk of overfitting if A simply answers every query with its empirical value on the sample S. However, if A is a differentially private algorithm then the interaction would not lead to overfitting: 
In words, if A is a differentially private algorithm operating on a database containing n i.i.d. samples from the distribution D, then A cannot (with significant probability) identify a lowsensitivity function that behaves differently on the sample S and on D n .
Very recently, Steinke and Ullman [16] observed that Theorem 1.1 gives alternative proofs for classical concentration bounds for low-sensitivity functions, such as the Chernoff bound and McDiarmid's Inequality: Fix a function f : X n → R with sensitivity λ and consider the trivial mechanism A f that ignores its input and always outputs f . Such a mechanism is (ε, δ)-differentially private for any choice of ε, δ ≥ 0 and hence Theorem 1.1 yields (up to constants) McDiarmid's Inequality:
where the last equality follows by setting n = 1 ε 2 log( 4ε δ ). In light of this result it is natural to ask if similar techniques yield concentration bounds for more general families of queries, and in particular queries that are not low-sensitivity functions. In this work we derive conditions under which this is the case.
Differential Privacy, Max-Information, and Typical Stability
Let D be a fixed distribution over a domain X, and consider a family of functions mapping databases in X n to the reals, such that for every function f in the family we have that |f (S) − f (D n )| is small w.h.p. over S ∼ D n . Specifically,
That is, for every function f ∈ F α,β (D) we have that its empirical value over a sample S ∼ D n is α-close to its expected value w.p. 1 − β. Now consider a differentially private algorithm A : X n → F α,β (D) that takes a database and returns a function from F α,β (D) . What can we say about the difference |f (S) − f (D n )| when f is chosen by A(S) based on the sample S itself? Using the notion of max-information, Dwork et al. [5] showed that if β is small enough, then w.h.p. the difference remains small. Informally, they showed that if A is differentially private, then
So, if A is a differentially private algorithm that ranges over functions which are very concentrated around their expected value (i.e., β < e −ε 2 n ), then |f (S) − f (D n )| remains small (w.h.p.) even when f is chosen by A(S) based on the sample S. When β > e −ε 2 n it is easy to construct examples where a differentially private algorithm identifies a function f ∈ F α,β (D) such that |f (S)−f (D n )| is arbitrarily large with high probability. So, in general, differential privacy does not guarantee generalization for adaptively chosen functions of this sort. However, a stronger notion than differential privacytypical stability -presented by Bassily and Freund [1] does guarantee generalization in this setting. Informally, they showed that if a typically stable algorithm B outputs a function f ∈ F α,β (D), then
The results of this article provide another piece of this puzzle, as we show that (a variant of) differential privacy can in some cases be used to prove that a function f is in F α,β (D).
Our Results
Notation. Throughout this article we use the convention that f (D n ) is the expected value of the function f over a sample containing n i.i.d. elements drawn according to the distribution D.
Fix a function f : X n → R, let D be a distribution over X, and let S ∼ D n . Our goal is to bound the probability that |f (S) − f (D n )| is large by some (hopefully) easy-to-analyze quantity. To intuit our result, consider for example what we get by a simple application of Markov's Inequality:
We show that using differential privacy we can replace the term |f (S)−f (D n )| in the expectation with |f (S ∪ {x}) − f (S ∪ {y})|, which can sometimes be easier to analyze. Specifically, we show the following.
where S (i←z) is the same as S except that the i th element is replaced with z. Then for every ε > 0 we have that Pr
1 A similar notion -perfect generalization -was presented in [4] .
Observe that for a λ-sensitive function f , we have that the expectation in Equation (3) is zero, so the statement holds for every choice of β > 0 and n ≥ O 1 ε 2 log( 1 β ) , resulting in McDiarmid's Inequality (Equation (1)). Intuitively, Theorem 1.2 states that in order to obtain a high probability bound on |f (S) − f (D n )| is suffices to analyze the "expectation of the tail" of f (S) − f S (i←z) , as a function of the starting point λ.
We also show that the above bound can be improved whenever the "expectation of the head" of f (S) − f S (i←z) is smaller than λ. Specifically, Theorem 1.2 (part 2). If, in addition to (3) , ∃τ ≤ λ s.t. for every S ∈ X n and every 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have
Then for every ε > 0 we have that
Observe that while the expectation in (3) is over the entire sample S (as well as the replacement point), in requirement (4) the sample S is fixed. We do not know if this "worst-case" restriction is necessary.
In Section 4 we demonstrate how Theorem 1.2 can be used in proving a variety of concentration bounds, such as a high probability bound on |f (S) − f (D n )| for Lipschitz functions. In addition we show that Theorem 1.2 can be used to bound the probability that the number of triangles in a random graph significantly exceeds the expectation.
The Exponential Mechanism
We next describe the exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [14] . Definition 2.3 (Sensitivity). The sensitivity (or global sensitivity) of a function f : X n → R is the smallest λ such that for every neighboring S, S ∈ X n , we have |f (S) − f (S )| ≤ λ. We use the term "λ-sensitive function" to mean a function of sensitivity ≤ λ.
Let X be a domain and H a set of solutions. Given a database S ∈ X * , the exponential mechanism privately chooses a "good" solution h out of the possible set of solutions H. This "goodness" is quantified using a quality function that matches solutions to scores.
Definition 2.4 (Quality function).
A quality function is a function q : X * × H → R that maps a database S ∈ X * and a solution h ∈ H to a real number, identified as the score of the solution h w.r.t. the database S.
Given a quality function q and a database S, the goal is to chooses a solution h approximately maximizing q(S, h). The exponential mechanism chooses a solution probabilistically, where the probability mass that is assigned to each solution h increases exponentially with its quality q(S, h):
The Exponential Mechanism Input: privacy parameter ε > 0, finite solution set H, database S ∈ X n , and a λ-sensitive quality function q. 
Randomly choose
h ∈ H with probability exp( ε 2λ ·q(S,h)) h ∈H exp( ε 2λ ·q(S,h )) . 2. Output h.
Concentration Bounds
Let X 1 , . . . , X n be independent random variables where Pr[
Chernoff and Hoeffding bounds show that the sum is concentrated around this expected value:
The first two inequalities are known as the multiplicative Chernoff bounds [3] , and the last inequality is known as the Hoeffding bound [10] . The next theorem states that the Chernoff bound above is tight up to constant factors in the exponent. 
Concentration Bounds via Differential Privacy
In this section we show how the concept of differential privacy can be used to derive conditions under which a function f and a distribution D satisfy that |f (S)−f (D n )| is small w.h.p. when S ∼ D n . Our proof technique builds on the proof of Bassily et al. [2] for the generalization properties of a differentially private algorithm that outputs a low-sensitivity function. The proof consists of two steps:
Let A be selection procedure that, given S 1 , . . . , S T , chooses an index t ∈ [T ] with the goal of maximizing |f (S t ) − f (D n )|. We show that if A satisfies (a variant of) differential privacy then, under some conditions on the function f and the distribution D, the expectation of
That is, if A is differentially private, then its ability to identify a "bad" index t with large |f
2. We show that if |f (S) − f (D n )| is large w.h.p. over S ∼ D n , then it is possible to construct an algorithm A satisfying (a variant of) differential privacy that contradicts our expectation bound.
We begin with a few definitions.
Definitions
Notations. We use S ∈ (X n ) T to denote a multi-database consisting of T databases of size n over X. Given a distribution D over a domain X we write S ∼ D nT to denote a multi-database sampled i.i.d. from D.
Definition 3.1. Fix a function f : X n → R mapping databases of size n over a domain X to the reals. We say that two multi-databases
operates on T databases of size n from X. For a function f : X n → R and parameters ε, λ ≥ 0, we say that M is (ε, (f , λ))-differentially private if for every set of outputs F ∈ Y and for every
Claim 3.3 follows from basic arguments in differential privacy. The proof appears in the appendix for completeness.
Multi Sample Expectation Bound
The proof of Theorem 1.2 contains somewhat unwieldy notation. For readability, we present here a restricted version of the theorem, tailored to the case where the function f computes the sample sum, which highlights most of the ideas in the proof. The full proof of Theorem 1.2 is included in the appendix.
Notation. Given a sample S ∈ X n , we usef (S) to denote the sample sum, i.e.,f (S) = x∈S x.
private algorithm that operates on T databases of size n from X, and outputs an index
Proof. We denote S = (S 1 , . . . , S T ), where every S t is itself a vector S t = (x t,1 , . . . , x t,n ). We have:
In the case where max m∈ [t] |x m,i | > 1 we replace the expectation over t ← A( S) with the deterministic choice for the maximal t (this makes the expression larger). When max m∈ [t] |x m,i | ≤ 1 we can use the privacy guarantees of algorithm A. Given a multi-sample S ∈ (X n ) T we use S −i to denote a multi-sample identical to S, except that the i th element of every sub-sample is replaced with 0. Using Claim 3.3 we get
We next want to remove the first indicator function. This is useful as without it, the expectation of a fresh example from D is zero. To that end we add and subtract the expression
x t,i to get (after replacing again E t with max t )
Multi Sample Amplification
Theorem 3.5 (Simplified High Probability Bound). Let D be a distribution over a domain X such that
We present the proof idea of the theorem. Any informalities made hereafter are removed in Section A.
Proof sketch. We only analyze the probability thatf (S) is large. The analysis is symmetric for whenf (S) is small. Assume towards contradiction that with probability at least ∆ 2ε we have that f (S) ≥ 30εn. We now construct the following algorithm B that contradicts our expectation bound.
Algorithm 1 B
Input: T databases of size n each: S = (S 1 , . . . , S T ), where T 2ε/∆ .
For i ∈ [T ], define q( S, i) =f (S i
).
Sample t * ∈ [T ] with probability proportional to exp
The fact that algorithm B is (ε, (f , 1))-differentially private follows from the standard analysis of the Exponential Mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [14] . The analysis appears in the full version of this proof (Section A) for completeness. Now consider applying B on databases S = (S 1 , . . . , S T ) containing i.i.d. samples from D. By our assumption on D, for every t we have thatf (S t ) ≥ 30εn with probability at least ∆ 2ε . By our choice of T = 2ε/∆ , we therefore get
The probability is taken over the random choice of the examples in S according to D. Had it been the case that the random variable max t∈ [T ] f (S t ) is non-negative, we could have used Markov's inequality to get
Even though it is not the case that max t∈ [T ] f (S t ) is non-negative, we now proceed as if Equation (7) holds. As described in the full version of this proof (Section A), this technical issue has an easy fix. So, in expectation, max t∈[T ] q( S, t) is large. In order to contradict the expectation bound of Theorem A.2, we need to show that this is also the case for the index t * that is sampled on Step 2. To that end, we now use the following technical claim, stating that the expected quality of a solution sampled as in Step 2 is high. Claim 3.6 (e.g., [2] ). Let H be a finite set, h : H → R a function, and η > 0. Define a random variable
For every fixture of S, we can apply Claim 3.6 with h(t) = q( S, t) and η = ε 2 to get
Taking the expectation also over S ∼ D nT we get that
This contradicts Theorem A.2 whenever ε > 1 n ln(T ) = 1 n ln(2ε/∆).
Applications
In this section we demonstrate how Theorem 1.2 can be used in proving a variety of concentration bounds.
Example: Subgaussian Diameter and Beyond
Recall that for a low-sensitivity function f , one could use McDiarmid's Inequality to obtain a high probability bound on the difference |f (S) − f (D n )|, and this bound is distribution-independent. That is, the bound does not depend on D. Over the last few years, there has been some work on providing distribution-dependent refinements to McDiarmid's Inequality, that hold even for functions with high worst-case sensitivity, but with low "average-case" sensitivity, where "average" is with respect to the underlying distribution D. The following is one such refinement, by Kontorovich [13] .
Definition 4.1 ([13]
). Let D be a distribution over a domain X, and let ρ :
In [13] , Kontorovich showed the following theorem: 
where S (i←x) is the same as S except that the i th element is replaced with x. Then,
Informally, using the above theorem it is possible to obtain concentration bounds for functions with unbounded sensitivity (in worst case), provided that the sensitivity (as a random variable) is subgaussian. In this section we show that our result implies a similar version of this theorem. While the bound we obtain is weaker then Theorem 4.2, our techniques can be extended to obtain concentration bounds even in cases where the sensitivity is not subgaussian (that is, in cases where the subgaussian diameter is unbounded, and hence, Theorem 4.2 could not be applied).
Let
So, 
, t > σ · n 1.5
Clearly, the bound of Theorem 4.2 is stronger. Note, however, that the only assumption we used here is that
dt is small. Hence, as the following section shows, this argument could be extended to obtain concentration bounds even when ∆ SG (X, ρ, D) is unbounded. We remark that Inequality 9 can be slightly improved by using part 2 of Theorem 1.2. This will be illustrated in the following section.
Example: Concentration Under Infinite Variance
Let f : X n → R be a function mapping databases of size n over a domain X to the reals. Assume that there exists a function ρ : X 2 → R ≥0 s.t. for every i ∈ [n], every S ∈ X n , and every y, z ∈ X we have that
where S (i←x) is the same as S except that the i th element is replaced with x.
As stated in the previous section, the results of [13] can be used to obtain a high probability bound on |f (S) − f (D n ) | whenever Pr x,y∼D [ρ(x, y) ≥ t] ≤ exp −t 2 /σ 2 for some σ > 0. In contrast, our bound can be used whenever
In particular, we now use it to obtain a concentration bound for a case where the probability distribution of ρ(x, y) is heavy tailed, and in fact, has infinite variance. Specifically, assume that all we know on ρ(x, y) is that Pr[ρ(x, y) ≥ t] ≤ 1/t 2 for every t ≥ 1 (this is a special case of the Pareto distribution, with infinite variance). Let λ ≥ 1. We calculate:
In order to apply Theorem 1.2 we need to ensure that n ≥ O 1 ε·min{1,ε} ln λ·min{1,ε} ∆ + 1 . Assuming that n ≥ ln(λ), with our choice of ∆ it suffices to set ε = Θ 1 n ln(λ) . Plugging ε and ∆ into Theorem 1.2, and simplifying, we get
Observe that the above bound decays as 1/t 2 . This should be contrasted with Markov's Inequality, which would decay as 1/t. Recall the assumption that the variance of ρ(x, y) is unbounded. Hence, the variance of f (S) can also be unbounded, and Chebyshev's inequality could not be applied.
As we now explain, Inequality 10 can be improved using part 2 of Theorem 1.2. To that end, for a fixed database S ∈ X n , we calculate:
In order to apply part 2 of Theorem 1.2 we need to ensure that n ≥ O 
, t > n We say that three vertices i, j, form a triangle if there is an edge between any pair of them. Denote f K 3 (S) the number of triangles in the graph defined by S. For a small constant α, we would like to have an exponential bound on the following probability
Example: Triangles in Random Graphs
Pr f K 3 (S) ≥ (1 + α) · f K 3 (D n ) .
Specifically, we are interested in small values of
The difficulty with this choice of p is that (in worst-case) adding a single edge to the graph can increase the number of triangles by (N − 2), which is much larger then the expected number of triangles. Indeed, until the breakthrough work of Vu [17] in 2002, no general exponential bounds were known. Following the work of [17] , in 2004 Kim and Vu [11] presented the following sharp bound:
Theorem 4.3 ([11], informal). Let α be a small constant. It holds that
In this section we show that our result can be used to analyze this problem. While the bound we obtain is much weaker than Theorem 4.3, we find it interesting that the same technique from the last sections can also be applied here. To make things more concrete, we fix
In order to use our concentration bound, we start by analyzing the expected difference incurred to f K 3 by resampling a single edge. We will denote i,j (S) as the number of triangles that are created (or deleted) by adding (or removing) the edge {i, j}. That is, i,j (S) = i, j : x {i, } = 1 and x { ,j} = 1 .
Observe that i,j (S) does not depend on x {i,j} . Moreover, observe that for every fixture of i < j we have that i,j (S) is the sum of (N − 2) i.i.d. indicators, each equals to 1 with probability p 2 .
Fix S = x {1,2} , . . . , x {n−1,n} ∈ {0, 1} n and x ∈ {0, 1}. We have that
where S ({i,j}←x ) is the same as S except with x {i,j} replaced with x . Fix i < j. We can now calculate
Recall that i,j (S) is the sum of (N − 2) i.i.d. indicators, each equals to 1 with probability p 2 . We can upper bound the probability that i,j (S) ≥ λ with the probability that a sum of N such random variables is at least λ. We will use the following variant of the Chernoff bound, known as the Chernoff-Hoeffding theorem: 
where D(a b) is the relative entropy between an a-coin and a p-coin (i.e. between the Bernoulli(a) and Bernoulli(p) distribution):
Using the Chernoff-Hoeffding theorem, for p 2 N < λ < N , we have
Recall that we fixed p = N −3/4 . Choosing λ = N 1/13 , we get:
We will use the following claim to bound D N −12/13 N −6/4 :
Using Claim 4.5, for large enough N , we have that
So, denoting ∆ = 2pN · exp −N 1/13 , we get that
In order to obtain a meaningful bound, we will need to use part 2 of Theorem 1.2. To that end, for every fixture of S ∈ X n and i < j we can compute
Finally, in order to apply Theorem 1.2, we need to ensure that n ≥ O λ ε min{1,ε}τ ln min{1,ε}τ ∆ .
With our choices for ∆ and τ, it suffices to set ε = Θ λ np . Plugging ε, ∆ and τ into Theorem 1.2, and simplifying, we get that
It remains to prove Claim 4.5:
Proof of Claim 4.5 .
Using the fact that log(1 − x) ≥ −2x for every 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 2 , and assuming that N ≥ 2 1/b , we have that
Privately Identifying a High-Sensitivity Function
Let S be a sample of n i.i.d. elements from some distribution D. Recall that if a low-sensitivity function f is identified by a differentially private algorithm operating on S, then w.h.p.
. In this section we present a simple example showing that, in general, this is not the case for high-sensitivity functions. Specifically, we show that a differentially private algorithm operating on S can identify a high-sensitivity function f s.t. 
For every f in the range of A it holds that Pr
That is, given a database S of n rows from {±1} d , we define f t (S) as 0 if the sum of column t (in absolute value) is less than some threshold, and otherwise set f t (S) to be ±B (depending on the sign of the sum). Observe that the global sensitivity of f t is B, and that f t (U n )
Also, by the Hoeffding bound, we have that
So, for every fixed t, with high probability over sampling S ∼ U n we have that f t (S) = 0 = f t (U n ). Nevertheless, as we now explain, if d is large enough, then an (ε, 0)-differentially private algorithm can easily identify a "bad" index t * such that |f t * (S)| = B.
Consider the algorithm that on input S = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) samples an index t ∈ [d] with probability proportional to exp ε 4 i∈[n] x i,t . We will call it algorithm BadIndex. By the properties of the exponential mechanism, algorithm BadIndex is (ε, 0)-differentially private. Moreover, with probability at least 3/4, the output t * satisfies i∈ [n] x i,t * ≥ max
In addition, by Theorem 2.6 (tightness of Chernoff bound), for every fixed t it holds that
As the columns are independent, taking d = 2
2 β
45
, we get that
Combining (17) and (18) we get that with probability at least 1/2 algorithm BadIndex identifies an index t * such that i∈ [n] x i,t * ≥ 1.11 · 2n ln(2/β) − 4 ε ln (4d) .
Assuming that n ≥ O(
1 ε 2 ln(1/β)) we get that with probability at least 1/2 algorithm BadIndex outputs an index t * s.t. f t * (S) = B.
Max-Information
In this section we show that algorithm BadIndex has relatively high max-information: Given two (correlated) random variables Y , Z, we use Y ⊗ Z denote the random variable obtained by drawing independent copies of Y and Z from their respective marginal distributions. 
An algorithm A : X n → F has β-approximate max-information of k over product distributions,
It follows immediately from the definition that approximate max-information controls the probability of "bad events" that can happen as a result of the dependence of A(S) on S: for every event O, we have Pr
Consider again algorithm BadIndex : ({±1}) n → F that operates on database S of size n = O( 1 ε 2 ln(1/β)) and identifies, with probability 1/2, a function f s.t. f (S) 0, even though f (S ) = 0 w.p. 1 − β for a fresh sample S . Let us define O as the set of all pairs (S, f ), where S is a database and f is a function in the range of algorithm BadIndex such that f (S) 0. That is,
If we assume that I 1/4 ∞,P (BadIndex, n) ≤ k, then by Definition 5.2 we have:
A Concentration Bounds Through Differential Privacy -Missing Details
Proof.
A.1 Multi Sample Expectation Bound
Lemma A.1 (Expectation Bound). Let D be a distribution over a domain X, let f : X n → R , and let ∆, λ be s.t. for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n it holds that
where S (i←z) is the same as S except that the i th element is replaced with z.
λ))-differentially private algorithm that operates on T databases of size n from X, and outputs an index
If, in addition to (19) , there exists a number 0 ≤ τ ≤ λ s.t. for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and every fixture of S ∈ X n we have that
Then,
We now present the proof assuming that (20) holds for some 0 ≤ τ ≤ λ. This is without loss of generality, as trivially it holds for τ = λ.
Proof of Lemma A.1. Let S = (S 1 , . . . , S T ) ∼ D nT be independent of S. Recall that each element S t of S is itself a vector (x t,1 , . . . , x t,n ), and the same is true for each element S t of S . We will sometimes refer to the vectors S 1 , . . . , S T as the subsamples of S.
We define a sequence of intermediate samples that allow us to interpolate between S and S . Formally, for ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} define S = (S 1 , . . . , S T ) ∈ (X n ) T where S t = (x t,1 , . . . , x t,n ) and
That is, every subsample S t of S is identical to S t on the first elements, and identical to S t thereafter. By construction we have S 0 = S and S n = S . Moreover, for every t we have that S t and S −1 t differ in exactly one element. In terms of these intermediate samples we can write:
Given a multisample S = (S 1 , . . . , S T ) ∈ (X n ) T , a vector Z = (z 1 . . . , z T ) ∈ X T , and an index 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we define S (k←Z) to be the same as S except that the k th element of every subsample S i is replaced with z i . Observe that by construction, for every , Z we have S ,( ←Z) = S −1,( ←Z) . Thus,
Observer that the pairs ( S, S ) and S, S ,( ←Z) are identically distributed. Namely, both S and S ,( ←Z) agree with S on the last (n − ) entries of every subsample, and otherwise contain i.i.d.
samples from D. Hence, the expectation of f (S t ) − f S ,( ←Z) t is zero, and we get
Observer that the pair ( S −1 , S) has the same distribution as ( S, S −1 ). Specifically, the first component is nT independent samples from D and the second component is equal to the first component with a subset of the entries replaced by fresh independent samples from D. Thus,
we now use the properties of algorithm A to argue that A( S −1 ) ≈ A( S ). Be Claim 3.3 we get that
We can remove one of the two requirements in the indicator function in the middle row (this makes the expression bigger), to get:
Furthermore, we can replace
− f (S m )| ≤ λ in the middle row with the weaker requirement -just for the specific t that was selected by algorithm A. This yields:
Using the fact that the pairs ( S, S ) and ( S , S) are identically distributed, we can switch them in the middle row, to get
Using our assumptions on the function f and the distribution D (for the middle row), brings us to: 
Our next task is to remove the indicator function in the first row. This is useful as the pairs S , S ( ←Z) and ( S , S) are identically distributed, and hence, if we were to remove the indicator function, the first row would be equal to zero. To that end we add and subtract the first row with the complementary indicator function (this amounts to multiplying the third row by 2). We get
The issue now is that the expression inside the indicator function is different from the expression outside of it. To that end, we split the indicator function as follows: 
